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Abstract:

This essay presents my analysis of Didi Chuxing’s ride-hailing business
in the Chinese market considering economic concepts and tools such as
market structure, economies of scale and price anchoring to understand
aspects of Didi Chuxing such as its cost structure, pricing strategies and
marketing methods. As the largest ride-hailing platform in China, the
success of Didi Chuxing can offer important guidelines for the healthy
development and expansion of this industry to other countries.
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Introduction

T

he optimization and integration of “Internet Plus” in the allocation of
social resources has led to the evolution of economic reforms. Many
vertical industries have deep integration with the internet and have developed
new business forms and models. There is no doubt that the ride-hailing service
is the most eye catching of all (Deloitte, 2019).
Since the establishment of Uber in 2009, the global ride-hailing market has
developed rapidly. The global market scale of ride-hailing reached US$153,91
million in 2018 and is expected to show an annual growth rate (CAGR 20192023) of 14.8 percent to generate a market volume of US$318,765 million by
2023 (Statista, 2019).
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China is home to the world’s largest ride-hailing market, estimated by consulting firm Bain &
Company to be worth more than US$20 billion in 2016. After several rounds of mergers, the ridehailing industry in China has formed a market in which Didi Chuxing has a share of over 90 percent,
and Yidao, Shouqi, Shenzhou, Meituan and Caocao have a slight share in each region (Bill Peng,
2018).
China has the largest ride-hailing market in the world, and Didi has developed into the world’s
largest ride-hailing company. Their business models and operations in China provide a good example
by which to understand Didi Chuxing and to provide guidance for the development of the global ridehailing market.

Main Analysis
Market Structure
Market structure is a collective term for different types of markets such as perfect competition and
monopolistic competition. Market share is usually used as the main criterion.
The current Chinese ride-hailing market has shown a trend of transition from oligopoly to
monopoly (Ma et al., 2019). After the acquisition of Uber’s China operations in 2016, Didi Chuxing
has almost monopolized the Chinese market, becoming synonymous with the ride-hailing service (Bill
Peng, 2018).
According to Strategy& (the global strategy consulting team at PwC), Didi Chuxing has
dominated the ride-hailing market in China with a market share of over 90 percent since 2018. The
rest of the ride-hailing companies, such as Meituan and Shouqi accounted for less than 10 percent of
the market share. These companies should provide more differentiated services and improve service
quality in order to gain more advantages in the next round of competition (Liu & Kim, 2016).
In addition, the entry barriers of the Chinese ride-hailing market cannot be ignored, which is
why investment interests are restricted in this industry. Barriers include the difficulty of obtaining
government permits (Sun et al., 2019). Due to safety and management reasons, the Chinese
government has strict supervision over ride-hailing platforms. Often it takes nearly one year from
registration to obtaining a license (Bingwan, 2018). China’s largest ride-hailing company, Didi
Chuxing, operated in the gray zone in its first few years, and their drivers were often punished
by traffic police for unlicensed operation (Xue, Chung and Yu, 2018). Furthermore, the project
requires a great amount of capital investment at the beginning. The success of Didi Chuxing in the
Chinese market proves that only a large amount of initial investment can attract a steady stream
of customers. This Beijing-based ride-hailing company has a valuation of US$56 billion and has
raised more than US$20 billion since its inception, making it the second most valuable private
Chinese company in history, according to Crunchbase. It is backed by notable investors and
companies like Singapore’s Temasek, China’s Tencent and Alibaba, Japan’s Softbank, and Apple
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(Stephan, 2018). Such a huge amount of upfront investment has discouraged many companies.
Also, a ride-hailing platform needs strong IT support. In order to maximize profits, ride-hailing
companies need to use big data and other tools to optimize dispatches and routing (Jia, Xu and
Liu, 2016). The electronic information of the drivers needs to be updated in real time through
internet technology. Road-vehicle positioning systems is also a focus for these platforms (Luo et
al., 2019). These three barriers make it difficult for many companies to enter the Chinese ridehailing market.
Competition Regulation
Competition regulation usually refers to a scheme to restrict unfair market competition through
legislation or by administrative means.
On the one hand, China’s market oversight of current supervision of ride-hailing market is mainly
from the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of China.
The Chinese government has not yet established a special competition authority to regulate the anticompetitive practice of the ride-hailing market except for joint conferences organized for specific
cases such as the inter-ministerial joint conference on Collaborative Supervision of New Business
Status of Transportation. These temporary agencies are not able to cope with the cumbersome, unfair
competition cases (Deighton-Smith, 2018).
On the other hand, China has a relatively complete legal system to supervise the competition in
ride-hailing market. In 2007, the Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted at
the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress of the People’s
Republic of China. This law was enacted for the purpose of preventing and restraining monopolistic
conduct, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing economic efficiency, safeguarding
the interests of consumers and social public interest, and promoting the healthy development of the
socialist market economy (National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 2007). In
addition, many local governments have also introduced competition regulations to manage the ridehailing market. For example, in order to compete fairly, the governments of Shanghai and Beijing
have launched a series of rules such as price floor and merger review to prevent a certain company
from forming a monopoly (Sun & Ding, 2019).
The Chinese ride-hailing market has been investigated for monopoly. In September 2016, Shen
Danyang, spokesperson of the Ministry of Commerce, said that the investigation of the merger of Didi
and Uber China was in accordance with related laws and regulations of China. (Hook, 2016).
Production Function
As a ride-hailing services platform company, the main business of Didi Chuxing is to build an
information link between drivers and passengers (Deloitte, 2019). Unlike traditional industries, Didi
Chuxing is a new business model rooted in the sharing economy (Guo et al., 2018). Cost structure
analysis of this new business should also consider more factors.
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Data source: Didi Data
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Figure 1 The rato of cost of Didi chuxing’s ride-hailing business to revenue(2018)

Figure 1 describes the cost structure of Didi Chuxing in 2018 according to Didi Data (2018). The
first section is the driver’s bonus. This is an extra reward for those drivers who pick up and drop
off passengers in busy places like downtown during rush hours. Didi Chuxing uses subsidies to
motivate drivers to do more work and it is similar to attendance and service bonuses (Chen, 2018).
This section accounts for 7 percent of revenue and can be classified as variable cost. The second cost
is the operating cost, which is also the largest cost of Didi Chuxing, which occupied 10 percent and
can be considered as a fixed cost. This section mainly includes technical research and development
(R&D), security, customer service, human resources, offline operations and other costs. The last part
is tax and handling fees paid to third-party payment companys, which accounts for 4 percent and is a
variable cost. The variable cost ratio reveals the total amount of variable cost incurred by a business,
stated as a proportion of its revenue (Law, 2016).

According to the above analysis, the variable cost ratio of Didi Chuxing is 11 percent, and the
variable cost section accounts for more than half of the total costs. This data shows that Didi Chuxing
is a light asset company. From a practical point of view, Didi plays only the role of an intermediary in
ride-hailing and does not have to be responsible for product supply, i.e., there is no need to purchase
cars (Wang, 2019). Due to the small proportion of fixed cost, Didi Chuxing is not sensitive to the
market, which is the main reason why it can continuously transform and upgrade products according
to the market environment.
As an online ride-hailing company, the main factors of production of Didi Chuxing should
be technology and labor. It is necessary to focus on technology if Didi Chuxing wants to achieve
leapfrog development after its initial phenomenal growth. After the subsidy war, Didi Chuxing
recruited hundreds of people from Baidu, Tencent, as well as Ali’s cloud computing and other big
data departments in order to set up its own big data team. Constant maintenance and upgrade of this
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system have become the magic weapon of Didi in the ride-hailing market (Min & Kim, 2018). Didi
Chuxing needs to build a professional and large customer service and marketing team to deal with
cumbersome daily affairs (Crothall, 2018). According to relevant data from 58.com, a famous Chinese
recruitment website, Didi had more than 13,000 employees in 2019. It is undeniable that this means a
large labor cost.
Since Didi Chuxing does not disclose more financial information, this essay focuses more on the
economies of scale model for theoretical analysis.
Average cost
LRAC
C

C1

0

Q

Q1

Output

Figure 2 Economies of scale

Figure 2 is a theoretical model diagram of economies of scale. It refers to the phenomenon of
increasing economic efficiency by expanding production. When a company continues to develop, i.e.,
as output increases, more products share the fixed cost, the average cost will fall, and the company
will achieve benefits from economies of scale (Stigler, 1958). For Didi Chuxing, its main factors
of production are technology and labor. Although it belongs to a sharing economy, it also follows
traditional economic theory. Zha, Yin and Yang (2016) thought that when Didi merged with Uber
and became the biggest player in the Chinese ride-hailing market, it gained very large benefits from
economies of scale.
Price Discrimination
Price discrimination is an important monopoly pricing behavior, and it is a pricing strategy for
monopoly enterprises to obtain surplus profits through differential prices. Price discrimination usually
means that when a supplier of goods or services provides different recipients with the same grade
and the same quality of goods or services, different selling prices or charging standards are applied
between the recipients.
Didi Chuxing meets three conditions of adopting a price discrimination method. First, Didi
Chuxing has strong market power. This is the basis for its price discrimination strategy. Second,
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│当代社会科学│2 0 2 0 年第5 期│

customers of ride-hailing services have different preferences and needs, and Didi Chuxing can
easily classify and price them. Didi Chuxing depends on the analysis method of big data, dividing
consumers into various types and marking their preferences. This effective method provides data
support for the use of price discrimination (Gu & Huang, 2018). Third, Didi Chuxing is able to prevent
resale. Ride-hailing users need to associate their information with an app account and Didi Chuxing
can avoid resale by confirming identity before service (Hagiu & Wright, 2017).
Big data bias helps Didi Chuxing to use the first-degree price discrimination method (FDPD)
although they did not admit it (Shiller, 2013). FDPD is a situation in which a firm sells each unit at
the maximum amount any customer is willing to pay, so prices differ across customers and a given
customer may pay more for some units than for others.

Figure 3 First Degree (perfect) Discrimination

Figure 3 is a graph drawn according to the theory of FDPD. It indicates that the goal of the sellers
is to extract all consumer surplus to achieve maximum profit. Many traditional-based views argue
that it is unpractical to use FDPD because no seller knows every buyer’s reservation price (Carroll &
Coates, 1999). However, according to Shiller (2013), the application of big data has made this possible:
Didi Chuxing uses big data to collect passengers’ personal information, and by analyzing customer
preferences it can calculate consumers’ reservation price for their ride-hailing services. For instance,
a passenger using an iPhone will pay more than a passenger using an Android mobile phone; a new
customer’s price is lower than an old customer’s. This approach, which is very close to FDPD, has
brought huge benefits to Didi.
Didi Chuxing provides a fee reduction for customers who use their services multiple times, which
is regarded as second-degree price discrimination (SDPD). SDPD is a situation in which a firm
charges a different price for large purchases than for smaller quantities, so that the price paid varies
according to the quantity purchased.
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Figure 4 Second Degree Discrimination

Figure 4 is a graph drawn according to the theory of SDPD. By using the SDPD method, firms
take part of the consumer surplus and can generate larger revenues and profits compared to charging
a single lower price for larger quantities (Carroll & Coates, 1999). Didi Chuxing often offers discounts
for frequent users, and those who regularly use their services can get fee reductions from time to
time. Additionally, Didi will provide a reasonable fare solution for corporate customers. Finally, Didi
Chuxing essentially allows different riding fees for identical trips. Since tips go directly to drivers,
adding tips makes the request more attractive to drivers and thus increases the probability of securing
riding services. The tipping option is interpreted as a device for second-degree price discrimination
(Duan & Liu, 2019).
Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric information means that each person in a transaction has different information. In
socio-political, economic and other activities some members have information that other members
do not have, which results in information asymmetry. In the context of market economy, various
types of personnel have different understandings of relevant information. Those who have sufficient
information are often in a more favorable position, while those with poor information are in a
disadvantaged position. Addressing information asymmetries can make markets fairer.
The Chinese ride-hailing market has become more transparent, and passengers and drivers can
easily find the right services and orders through the internet or other channels (Li & Chen, 2016). In
the field of promoting the transparency of industry information, Didi Chuxing has contributed a lot.
There are two problems resulting from asymmetric information: Adverse selection and moral
hazard. Adverse selection occurs when one party to a transaction possesses information about
a hidden characteristic that is unknown to other parties and takes economic advantage of this
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information (Wilson, 1979). One of the missions of Didi Chuxing is to solve the problem of adverse
selection that exists between passengers and drivers. Before 2012, in many Chinese cities, there was a
problem of “difficulty in ride-hailing”. Passengers could not obtain services, drivers accepted orders
selectively, and the no-load ratio remained high. According to iResearch (2018), the information
asymmetry between passengers and drivers is an important reason.
After the establishment of Didi Chuxing, the problem of adverse selection in the ride-hailing
market was basically solved by integrating resources and coordinating cooperation. When facing
passengers, Didi Chuxing will provide them with a list of services for their consumption decisions
before the trip. This list is very detailed, including the trip distance, fare, car conditions and even the
character of the driver (Hu et al., 2018). This effectively protects the passengers’ right to know and
prompts them to make a rational choice. When facing drivers, Didi Chuxing through data analysis,
obtains the demand for ride-hailing in the whole region and rationally allocates car resources (Zhao,
Zheng & Vo, 2017). This measure ensures that drivers receive orders in a shorter period, increases
drivers’ income and reduces the no-load ratio.
Moral hazard problems frequently occurred at the beginning of the development of the ridehailing market. Since the risks of operating vehicles and non-operating vehicles are different, insurers
have different pricing methods for these two products. It is hard to distinguish the operating or nonoperating status of the ride-hailing cars in many claims cases. If the owners of these cars do not
inform insurers, it is almost impossible for the insurance companies to know the operating status of
the vehicles. Therefore, many operating vehicles used non-operating insurance to get payments when
accidents occurred. Didi Chuxing was aware of industry vulnerabilities and they were committed to
solving this problem. Through information sharing, Didi helped insurance companies to distinguish
operating vehicles and reduced the economic losses of insurance companies caused by this moral
hazard (Nwogugu, 2019).
Advertising
As defined by the Advertising Association of the UK, advertising is a means of communication
with the users of a product or service. Advertisements are messages paid for by those who send them
and are intended to inform or influence people who receive them.
High-intensity advertising is one of the important means to Didi Chuxing’s success. It accurately
targets the customer and delivers different types of ads to appeal to different preferences (Tunca,
2019). On both digital media (such as the internet) and traditional media (such as newspapers), Didi
has launched a considerable number of advertisements, so that customers will think of Didi when
they mention ride-hailing. For lack of data regarding advertising expenses for Didi, according to the
financial reports of Uber in the same industry: advertising expenses can account for almost 10 percent
of revenue (Sundararajan, 2017).
A successful advertising campaign shifts the market demand curve by changing consumers’
tastes or informing them about new products. Thus, advertising is classified as either informative or
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persuasive. Didi Chuxing has used both types of advertising at different stages of development and
achieved unexpected results. At the beginning, Didi Chuxing informed people of the existence of
their product through various methods (Sheng, Wang & Sheng, 2018). For example, high subsidy:
this subsidy is not only for passengers but also for drivers. Many passengers could have a trip for
free and the drivers would be paid above the market price. It is estimated that Didi spent a total of
RMB19.45 billion on its subsidy policy (Fang, Huang & Wierman, 2019). This method allowed Didi
to harvest their first batch of customers. Before the advent of ride-hailing, people usually choose
taxis. Didi Chuxing tells passengers through various advertisements that they can provide a better car
environment and a lower fare than taxis. This approach has gradually changed the tastes of consumers,
allowing them to switch from taxi to Didi (Sharma, Gaur & Iyer, 2018).
Network Effects
The Chinese ride-hailing market is a two-sided market because its essence is a platform for
connecting drivers and passengers (Lee, 2017). When the number of users of this platform is growing
wildly, the network effect of this market is revealed.
The network effect is simply that a product increases its own value and attracts more users by
increasing the number of users. Network effects have always been one of the proudest features of
internet enterprises because they can serve more users without paying the same proportion of costs and
can also form interactive nodes among users. The essence of the internet is an information network.
internet products generally have a network effect. In the field with strong network effects, the oligopoly
effect is also more obvious. The advantage of Didi is that its large and dense network effect can defeat
small and evacuated network effects (Guo, Li and Zeng, 2019). However, it is true that the strength of
the network effect on ride-hailing is less than other traditional internet companies. For most traditional
internet companies, the network effect is a weapon to protect them. For example, as more people use
Microsoft Office System, there will be more people who must use the Office system, otherwise they
cannot open files sent by others. As more people buy things on an online shopping platform, it will
attract more businesses to sell things on it, which in turn will attract more customers. As more people
use a chat software, their friends will be forced to use the same chat software.
The network effect of the ride-hailing industry only exists in one certain city. Most passengers do
not travel from one city to another. Therefore, the network effect is only reflected in the city, and the
number of vehicles in a city is limited (Gao, Jing & Guo, 2017). Thus, the national layout of leading
companies in this industry such as Didi, will not become barriers for new enterprises with necessary
financial strength to enter the ride-hailing market in one or two cities.
Consumer Rationality
It is unreasonable to assume that consumers are perfectly rational in the ride-hailing market. There
are some strategies Didi Chuxing employs to take advantage of the bounded rationality of consumers.
First, frequent discounts to attract customer. Due to insufficient customer loyalty and high
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demand price elasticity in the ride-hailing market, the discount activities introduced by Didi can often
obtain many customers (Li & Lee, 2017). Second, use price anchoring to give consumers satisfaction.
Consumers always want to pay less money for the same services, so Didi remains the nominal price
above the real price which can also attract passengers. Finally, celebrity endorsements can also be
useful. Prospective Industry Research Institute (2018) thought that the majority of Didi’s customers
are young people who would like to buy products with star elements. Therefore, Didi Chuxing has
invested in cooperating with many popular stars like Deng Chao to attract consumers.

Conclusion
This paper used economic concepts such as market structure, economies of scale, and price
elasticity to analyze the finance, pricing, and marketing of Didi Chuxing, revealing the secrets of the
rapid development of this young company. This essay provides perspectives for the development of
the Chinese ride-hailing market over the next five years as more customized and targeted product
designs and business models will bring the ride-hailing market to the next level (Peng, 2018). The
future development of Didi Chuxing should be the integration of car manufacturers, technology
companies, travel platforms and map platforms thus integrating innovative development to achieve
greater success in the sharing economy.
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